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Child Care and Development Fund:
A Policy Analysis

COLLEEN K. VESELY

ELAINE A. ANDERSON

University of Maryland
Department of Family Science

Legislated as part of welfare reform, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the main source of child care government
funding earmarkedfor low-income families. As a block grant, with
broadfederal guidelines, states have significantfreedom in implementing this legislation to meet the needs of their citizens. This
diverse implementation has challenged legislators and scholars
trying to assess the success of CCDF across the United States. In
considering the evaluation research of CCDF,as well as the original goals of this legislation, several major themes related to the
diverse state implementation emerged, including access, equity,
and stability. This paper provides an overview of CCDF,explains
these themes, and uses the 2002 third wave of National Survey
of American Families (NSAF) data to demonstrate how policy
analysts and researchersmight use these themes to structurecomprehensive evaluations of CCDF at both state and federal levels.
Key words: child care policy, welfare reform, low-incomefamilies,
National Survey of American Families
The Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) is the main
source of government funding for child care, both in terms of
support for low-income families and overall quality improvement of child care services in the U.S. (Greenberg, Lombardi &
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, March 2009, Volume XXXVI, Number 1
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Schumacher, 2000). Created as a component of welfare reform
in 1996, it is a combination of child care funds available through
Social Security, Child Care and Development Block Grant
(CCDBG), and excess or transferred Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) funds; this combination of child
care funds was meant to restructure, streamline, and simplify
a somewhat complex child care support system (Long, Kirby,
Kurka & Waters, 1998). Specifically, CCDF provides financial
support through vouchers and grants to low-income parents
needing non-parental childcare while employed outside the
home. Generally, this legislation most significantly impacted
low-income single mothers, 68 percent of whom are employed
(Jones-DeWeever, Peterson, & Song, 2003).
Since welfare reform in 1996, marked by the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) and CCDF's inception, numerous scholars,
policy analysts, legislators and researchers have reported on
the successes and challenges of this legislation, with the focus
predominately on increased employment of single mothers
and a reduction in the number of welfare caseloads. Given
the complexity and diversity of CCDF, numerous researchers
have reported on the different methods of its implementation
across the country. However, fewer scholars have delved into
the complexity of CCDF as a block grant, to understand how
states' diverse implementations of CCDF serve families in the
most successful ways. Utilizing data from the 2002 National
Survey of American Families (NSAF), this paper examines
how state variation in CCDF implementation is associated
with maternal employment.
1996 Welfare Reform & CCDF
In August of 1996, President William Jefferson Clinton
signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), transforming
welfare into a program emphasizing responsibility and employment as a means to gain independence from government
support. This legislation authorized the creation of the Child
Care and Development Fund to support the employment
of mothers moving off welfare with their child care needs.
The high percentage of low-income single mothers required
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to work based upon the TANF regulations (Office of Family
Assistance, 2006) and the notion mothers would be more likely
to stay employed if they were confident their children were
being well cared for (Gomick, Meyers, & Ross, 1997) were two
major factors influencing the decision to add child care funding
to welfare reform.
CCDF Federal Guidelines
CCDF is a block grant, providing states with significant
freedom to coordinate the child care support for low-income
families in their state. However, there are certain broad federal
guidelines related to funding, spending, eligibility, administration and services, as well as quality. The major federal funding
sources for CCDF are a compilation of many child care programs operating during the mid-1990s. These sources include:
(1) Child care funds traditionally part of the Social Security
Act, including AFDC child care, transitional child care, and atrisk child care; (2) Child Care and Development Block Grant
(CCDBG), the program authorized by the CCDBG Act of 1990
and the precursor to CCDF; and (3) Excess TANF funding,
transferred to CCDF in each state or spent directly on child
care as families moved off the welfare rolls (Child Care Bureau,
2006).
Eligibility regulations set by the federal government are
very broad. States have significant freedom in determining
and expanding families' eligibility for CCDF funding; as long
as families are not discriminated against, parental rights are
not limited, and federal rules related to CCDF are not violated.
Federal requirements to receive CCDF funding state family
income must not be greater than 85 percent of the state median
income (Greenberg et al., 2000). In addition to being younger
than 13, the child must reside with the parent(s) who are either
employed, or participating in a "work activity" as defined by
TANF guidelines.
Federally, CCDF is administered through the Administration for Children and Families within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. At the state level, a lead agency is
chosen (e.g.: Department of Social Services, Office of Children
and Family Services) to administer CCDF. Services are provided through either vouchers for families, or grants paid directly
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to the child care provider. Based on federal recommendations,
families should not be paying more than 10 percent of their
monthly income for child care (Greenberg et al., 2000).
States may use CCDF (at least 4%) dollars to create and
coordinate activities aimed to achieve the following objectives
related to quality: education of parents; and increased parental choice, quality, and availability of child care (Greenberg et
al., 2000). Specifically, the federal government approves the
funding of quality improvement activities that: improve the
child care choices for families supported by CCDF; assist child
care providers in meeting government regulations, especially
health and safety requirements; and increase training, salary
and benefits for child care providers (Greenberg et al., 2000).
In 2004, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget and
Federal Agencies (OMBFA) assessed CCDF as a "moderately
effective" program. OMBFA highlighted the successful collaboration among the federal and state governments, as well
as the lead agencies in each state to create long- and short-term
goals. Despite the overall positive evaluation from the federal
government, with only 10-15 percent of eligible families nationwide receiving subsidies via CCDF (Matthews & Ewen,
2006), it is difficult to know how effective this legislation is
in each individual state, or among individual families receiving the benefit, given the diversity of state implementation.
Even evaluating each state program individually, with most
states utilizing different approaches for program implementation, difficulties arise in choosing which elements of each state
program to evaluate.
Empirical studies conducted on CCDF focus on issues associated with how this legislation has been implemented in
different states (Long, Kirby, Kurka, & Waters, 1998; Matthews
& Ewen, 2006; Meyers et al., 2006), as well as its effectiveness
in supporting low-income mothers in their return to work
(Gennetian, Crosby, Huston, & Lowe, 2004; Ross & Kirby,
2006; Schaefer, Kreader, & Collins, 2006). These studies have
concentrated on various CCDF goals including its shortcomings and how this policy interacts with families and children.
Three major themes that emerged related to the diverse implementation of CCDF include access, equity, and stability. These
themes are examined using 2002 NSAF and CCDF policy data
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in this paper.
Access to child care
A major consideration of legislators during the original development of federal regulations for CCDF was the importance
of equal access to high-quality child care for all parents. Access
to child care among the states is operationalized by examining
each state median income (SMI) eligibility requirement and the
presence of a waiting list impacting maternal employment.
Eligibility regulations.Federal guidelines stipulate a family's
income must not be greater than 85 percent of the state median
income (SMI) (Greenberg et al., 2000) in order to receive CCDF
support. For example, if the state median income for a family
of four is $50,000, then to be eligible for child care support this
family must not have an income higher than 85% of $50,000,
or $42,500. According to the National Child Care Information
Center (NCCIC) (2002), the average income eligibility limit
across the states was 57 percent of SMI, with a low of 35 percent
and a high of 80 percent. Our first hypothesis examines access
to child care and asserts that in states with higher SMI eligibility thresholds, low-income mothers will be employed more
hours per week.
Waiting lists. As federal funding for CCDF remains stagnant, waiting lists to receive child care assistance continue
to grow. For example, in Connecticut, without an increase in
federal funding, from 2002 to 2004, 46 percent fewer needy
families received a child care subsidy During this time, the
waitlist in Connecticut for a child care subsidy grew to over
130,000 families (Oliveira, 2005). In 2002 there were 21 states
with CCDF waiting lists, with an average list size of 9,651 families, while in 2004, 23 states had waiting lists with an average
list size of 24,000 families (NCCIC, 2002). The size of states'
waiting lists is related to both eligibility and funding. Our
second hypothesis related to maternal employment and access
to child care support asserts that in states with CCDF waiting
lists, low-income mothers are likely to be employed for fewer
hours per week.
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Equity of child care receipt
According to Meyers and colleagues (2006), "...essentially similar families have different likelihoods of receiving
assistance depending on the state in which they live" (p. 198).
Once in the system, families have differential costs and benefits
related to CCDF depending upon location, raising important
questions about whether or not the public child-care subsidy
system is providing assistance equitably to needy families.
Equity extends beyond considering access to CCDF support
and reflects the amount of benefits received by eligible families
based upon state policies. Equity is operationalized by considering how the variation in parents' co-payments at the state
level impact maternal employment.
CCDF co-payment variation among the states. Federal CCDF
guidelines state families utilizing child care support should
not spend more than 10 percent of their monthly income on
child care, and states should reimburse the cost of child care to
families at rates high enough to include 75% of local providers (Greenberg et al., 2000). However, some states reimburse at
higher rates, and/or include sliding fee scales based on income
levels, thus families' child care financial burden varies by state.
The percentage of family income paid by low-income families
in some states exceeds 10 percent, while in other states it is
significantly less than the federal benchmark; this discrepancy
may lead to a difference in the abilities of families to move out
of poverty. If child care costs are a greater proportion of families' incomes, in order to meet this financial burden, mothers
may need to be employed for more hours per week. Therefore,
our third hypothesis states mothers will be employed for a
greater number of hours per week in states where co-payments
are a higher percentage of the families' income.
Stability of child care
Stability refers to the length of time families receive the
CCDF benefit once their income increases. Based on child care
subsidies reported in five states, Meyers and colleagues (2006)
found that:
Currently, the assistance families receive is not very
continuous, does not last very long, and may be
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associated with substantial turnover in their children's
care arrangements. These dynamics do not bode well
either for families' economic security or for children's
healthy socioemotional development. (p. 198)
Stability was operationalized by considering how the presence
of two-tiered eligibility impacted maternal employment.
Two-tiered eligibilityfor child care assistance.In 2002, 11 states
had one income eligibility requirement for families just beginning to utilize CCDF subsidies, and a second tier of income
requirements for families already receiving CCDF support
(NCCIC, 2002). These tiered arrangements contribute to families' abilities to work towards self-sufficiency through increased earnings, without being at risk for losing their support
for child care because they crossed the eligibility threshold. For
example, in Massachusetts, the initial income requirement was
50 percent of SMI or 190 percent of the federal poverty line,
and the ongoing income limit was 85 percent of SMI or 323
percent of the federal poverty line (NCCIC, 2002). Utilizing
a two-tiered system requires the state to financially support
more families, but it appears to be an effective method for assisting families in gaining self-sufficiency, without creating a
cliff effect. Our fourth hypotheses asserts that in states with
two-tiered income eligibility requirements, mothers will be
employed a greater number of hours per week

Methods
Data and sample
The third wave of data from the National Survey of
America's Families (NSAF), collected in 2002 was utilized
to investigate the aforementioned research hypotheses (AbiHabib, Safir, & Triplett, 2002). This nationally representative
sample included 50,000 families. Of this total sample, 12,000
families had household incomes less than 200 percent of the
federal poverty line (FPL) (Urban Institute, 2002). A sub-sample
from these low-income families of single mother families with
children less than five was drawn. Thus, the sample inclusion
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criteria were: (1) Family income of less than 200 percent of the
FPL; (2) Single women (including married women not living
with their husbands) with children less than five years old; and
(3) Mothers who reported being employed at least 15 hours
per week. This selection yielded 1,390 mothers for the present
study. See Table 1 for additional demographic characteristics.
Four 2002 CCDF policy components related to access, equity,
and stability of care were added to the data set. These policy
variables were matched with NSAF participants based upon
state of residence.
Table 1. NSAF Sample Demographics
Race/
Employment
min
s.)
(Mean,
in hs
NSAF
Total
Sample

NSAF
Study
Sample

# of

Ethnicity

_Black*
_

Mother's Education

Children

White

Age of
Mother
"
(Mean,
m yrs.)

in hh)

<HS

HS

HS+

College+

t(Mean
Mean

41.82

14%

82%

37.4

0.72

11%

35%

26%

28%

34.78

45%

54%

32.1

1.24

2%

80%

16%

2%

*4% of participants in the NSAF total were Hispanic, Asian, Native American, or
"other"; 1% of the study sample participants were Hispanic, Asian, Native American,
or "other". The NSAF Study Sample is the sample that was used in the present study.

Measures
Level of maternal employment
The outcome variable, level of maternal employment, was
operationalized using the average number of hours per week
mothers were employed in the last year. This variable was
continuous and ranged from 15 to 110 hours per week with a
mean of 34.8 hours per week for the analytic sample of 1,390
mothers. We only included mothers employed at least 15 hours
per week to capture the experiences of mothers who had made
a strong commitment to the labor market. Additionally, irregularities in data for the mothers who worked less than 15 hours
per week resulted in a model that could not be estimated.
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There were 447 mothers, or 32 percent of the sample, who
reported working 40 hours per week, while 28 percent of the
sample reported working 35 hours per week. There were
a small percentage of mothers (8%) who worked more than
40 hours per week. However, overall, more than half of the
mothers (60%) in the sample worked less than 40 hours per
week.
State policy variationsrelated to access, equity and stability
The state policy variations, the main predictor variables for
the present analyses, were created from a data set based upon
the 2002 CCDF state plans (Herbst, 2005). CCDF policy data
from 2002 is utilized in this study as this is the year from which
the NSAF data are drawn. Specifically, the measure for the states'
waiting lists was dichotomous with "yes," indicating the state
had a waiting list, and "no," indicating the state did not have a
waiting list. There were 850 mothers (61 percent of the sample)
who lived in a state with a waiting list. The measure for tiered
eligibility was dichotomous, with "yes" indicating there were
two tiers for eligibility. There were 321 mothers (23 percent of
the sample) who lived in a state with tiered income eligibility.
The variable child care co-payment as a percentage of income was
measured continuously, ranging from 0 to 14 percent, with a
national average of 3.68 percent. However, for the mothers in
this sample, the mean, at 6.72 percent, was higher than the national average. States' median income eligibility levels were measured continuously. This variable indicates the percentage of
state median income a family must be below to be eligible for
the receipt of CCDF. This continuous variable ranged from 40
percent to 81 percent. The average state median income eligibility level across the states was 57 percent in 2002, as reflected
in the sample for the present study (see Table 2).
Control variables
The following variables were controlled in these analyses: maternal characteristics (mothers' age, mother's level
of education, race of the mother), household characteristics
(number of children under age five in the household), and
child care characteristics (center-based care or not). Maternal
characteristics were controlled for because they may be highly
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predictive of the amount of hours mothers are employed per
week. Specifically, women who are older may have more experience and thus may be considered more employable, increasing the number of hours these mothers work outside the home
per week. Similarly, women who have higher levels of education may have the opportunity to work more hours per week.
Mother's age was measured as a continuous variable and the
mean age of the women in the sample for the present study was
just under 33 years; the natural log of maternal age was used
in the present analyses to correct for the non-normal distribution of this variable. Education was categorized as less than
high school, high school (includes those who received a GED),
some college, and college/more than college. The number of
children under five was selected as a control variable because
mothers with younger children tend to be employed outside
the home for fewer hours per week. Finally, a control related to
being in center-based care was added to account for whether
the mother worked standard hours or not. This control was
considered appropriate for mothers' schedules, since most
child care centers only operate during standard business hours.
It is important to control for mothers' employment schedules
because they may impact how many hours per week mothers
are able to work outside the home.
Table 2. Maternal hours of employment and state policy adjustments-mean differences
State SMI
eligibility level *
Wait List***
Child care co-payment
as a % of income***
Two-tiered income
eligibility***

<57% (33.48)
0.68

>57% (37.55)
0.32

Yes (35.99)
0.61

No (32.91)
0.39

<10% (35.29)
0.71

>10% (33.56)
0.29

Yes (38.24)
0.23

No (33.76)
0.77

****, Statistically significant at the .1%, 1% and 5% levels. Mean hours of employment per week are in parentheses and proportions of mothers experiencing the
particular state policy adjustment are italicized.
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Data Analyses and Results
First, t-tests were conducted to determine whether there
were any statistical differences in the average number of hours
mothers were employed per week in states with and without
the specific CCDF policy variations. Second, a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted;
OLS regression was utilized based upon the continuous, interval level of measurement of the dependent variable average
number of hours of employment per week. An alpha level of
0.05 or less was considered significant throughout these analyses. In the first step of the OLS regressions addressing each of
the four hypotheses, the dependent variable of maternal hours
of employment was regressed on the policy variables of interest, without any controls. In the second model, maternal hours
of employment was regressed on the policy variables of interest, controlling for mothers' age, education and race/ethnicity.
In the third model, maternal employment was regressed onto
the specific policy variable of interest, adding a control for the
number of children under age five in the household. In the
fourth and final model, maternal employment was regressed
on the policy variables, including an additional control for
center-based care or whether or not the mother worked a standard schedule.
State SMI level of child care subsidy eligibility and maternal
employment
For the first hypothesis, mean comparisons indicated the
average number of hours mothers were employed each week,
in states where the SMI eligibility threshold was lower than
the national average, was significantly less (approximately
four hours per week on average) than their counterparts
who lived in states where the SMI thresholds for child care
subsidies were higher (p<.001). It appears that higher SMI
thresholds, which allow mothers to earn higher wages before
they become ineligible for child care subsidies, may contribute to the amount of hours mothers are employed per week.
Regression analyses indicated that as the SMI eligibility level
increased, mothers' hours of employment per week tended to
increase. In the first model, a one percent increase in an SMI
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eligibility threshold was associated with a 0.75 percentage
point increase in hours employed per week (see Table 3). SMI
eligibility levels, along with the other policy adjustments of interest, accounted for eight percent of the variance in mothers'
hours of employment each week. In the final model with all
the controls, for every one percent increase in SMI eligibility
thresholds, mothers hours of employment increased by 0.72
percentage points. Model 5 indicates that SMI, and maternal
employment are positively related (p<.001). Beyond their statistical significance, these results are practically relevant when
one considers that some states shift their SMI eligibility levels
fairly drastically-sometimes as much as 25 percentage points;
this magnitude of a shift may be associated with a more significant swing in the number of hours mothers are employed and
an adverse change in their earnings.
State waiting listfor child care subsidies and maternal employment
The second hypothesis, mothers will be employed fewer
hours per week in states where there are child care subsidy
waiting lists, was supported by the multivariate regression
analyses. Mean comparisons indicated a difference in the
number of hours mothers worked in states with a CCDF child
care subsidy waiting list versus mothers in states without a
waiting list; however, it was in the opposite direction than expected, with mothers in waiting list states working three hours
more per week on average than mothers in non-waiting list
states. In contrast, the regression analyses suggested support
for hypothesis two. In the first model, without any demographic controls, the policy variables explained eight percent
of the variance in maternal hours of employment. Accounting
for the demographic characteristics related to the mother and
the household in models two and three added significant explanatory value to the model (Adjusted R2= 0.254). In the full
model, controlling for maternal, household, and child care
characteristics, mothers who lived in a state with a wait list
were employed 4 percent fewer hours (p<.05). In the level
model (Model 5) including all the control variables, mothers
in wait list states worked 1.8 hours less than mothers in states
with no wait list (Adjusted R2= 0.198).
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Level of child care co-payment and maternalemployment
Mothers who lived in states where the subsidized child
care co-payment was less than 10 percent of mothers' incomes,
on average, tended to work significantly more hours per week

(p<.001) than their counterparts who were paying greater
than 10 percent of their monthly income for subsidized
child care. These findings do not support hypothesis three.
Table 3. Ln maternal hours of employment and CCDF state policy
adjustments. OLS results, weighted
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model4

Model 5

SMI

0.0036***
(0.0003)

0.0075***
(0.0005)

0.0073***
(0.0005)

0.0072***
(0.0005)

0.2577***
(0.0231)

-0.0432+
(0.0221)

-0.0386+
(0.0210)

-0.0382+
(0.0210)

-0.0424*
(0.0211)

-1.8697"
(0.9465)

0.0040+
(0.0040)

-0.0181***
(0.0025)

-0.0190**
(0.0026)

-0.0202***
(0.0026)

-0.7489***
(0.1179)

0.1661**
(0.0204)

0.3039***
(0.0216)

0.3007***
(0.0217)

0.3112**
(0.0220)

9.3832***
(0.9894)

(0.0286)

0.2420***
(0.0287)

0.2465***
(0.0290)

0.2583***
(1.305)

8.22070*

(0.0289)

0.1529"**
(0.0291)

0.1488***
(0.0290)

0.1465**
(1.305)

6.8982*

-0.0283+
(0.0208)

-0.0208
(0.9332)

-0.0553**

-3.0549***

-0.2201"**
(0.0176)

-0.2193**
(0.0176)

-0.2262***
(0.0178)

-6.8425***
(0.7989)

-0.1322*
(0.0440)

-0.1272"*
(0.0442)

-0.1099*
(0.0445)

-4.5084*
(2.0025)

0.0196
(0.0136)

0.0327*
(0.0145)

1.9914**
(0.6497)

0.0485**
(0.0182)

0.5122
(0.8202)

% Co-pay

LnMother age

>HS Edu
(0.0154)

-------

(0.0162)

# Children <5

Adj. R-squared

0.080

0.254

0.254

0.258

0.198

N

1390

1390

1390

1390

1390

***, **, * , + Statistically significant at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10% levels. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Maternal hours of employment are logged in the first four models;
in Model 5 maternal employment is level. Wait list (yes there is a wait list, no there
is not a wait list) and two-tier (yes there is a two-tier policy, no there is not a two tier
policy) are dichotomous. Maternal age is a logged variable, high school (comparison
group is those who received a high school diploma) and race (comparison group is
white). Center care refers to whether or not the child was in center based care. Each
model contains 1,390 observations.
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The multivariate findings did not support this hypothesis
either. Model one of the regression analyses, in which only
the policy variables are considered, suggests a one percent increase in the percentage of the mother's salary being used for
child care is associated with a 0.4 percentage point increase in
the number of hours the mother is employed per week (p<.10).
The controls added in the subsequent models adjusted the direction of the association between the state's co-payment level
as a percentage of one's salary and maternal employment to
be negative rather than positive as it was in model one. Thus
in the final model with all the controls, a one point increase in
the percentage of one's salary for the co-payment was associated with a two percentage point decrease in mothers' hours of
employment. Model 5 indicates that a one point change in the
percent of one's salary for child care cost was associated with
a decrease in 0.75 hours of employment per week (p<.001). It
appears that as mothers needed to use more of their salary for
child care costs, they chose to work less hours.
Tiered income eligibility and maternal employment
Mean comparisons provided significant support for hypothesis four in that mothers who lived in states with a tiered
eligibility threshold were employed nearly five hours per week
more than mothers who lived in states without tiered eligibility (see Table 2). The regression analyses indicated this relationship as well. In the first regression model, mothers who lived in
states with tiered income eligibility were employed 16 percent
more hours per week than their counterparts in states without
tiered income eligibility (p<.001) [see Table 3]. As maternal,
household, and child care controls were added to models two
through four, tiered eligibility remained statistically significant, with mothers who lived in states with tiered income eligibility working 30 to 31 percent more per week than mothers
in states without this policy variation. Based upon model 5,
mothers who lived in states with two-tiered income eligibility
guidelines were working 9.38 more hours per week than their
counterparts in states without this policy variation.
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Discussion
On average, 92 percent of the families receiving assistance from CCDF need this support in order to remain employed or to continue with school (U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services, 2002). In addition, it is expected the
percentage of parents in need of child care will continue to rise
given the increase in TANF work requirements. Research suggests mothers who are employed tend to remain steadily employed, and have greater potential to move off welfare if their
children are in high quality, stable care (Matthews & Ewen,
2006). The results of this study illustrate how states' chosen
methods for implementing CCDF are associated with lowincome mothers' levels of employment.
Mothers in states with higher state median income eligibility levels tended to achieve greater levels of employment.
Given the fluctuations across states in terms of these thresholds, mothers earning identical sums of money in two different
states could potentially have different child care subsidy eligibility statuses; one may get a child care subsidy and the other
may not. The federal guideline for SMI levels is that they not
exceed 85 percent. As federal funding for CCDF has remained
static since 2001 (Matthews & Ewen, 2006), more states have
decreased their state median income eligibility levels-motivated in large part by the desire to decrease waiting lists and
to serve more eligible families. For example, in Connecticut,
in response to funding restraints, the SMI eligibility level
was decreased from 75 percent to 50 percent; with this shift,
Connecticut claimed to be servicing 33 percent of eligible families rather than only 20 percent of families (Oliveira, 2005). In
sum, it is important to consider that regardless of how much
states change their definitions of families' eligibility for child
care subsidies, the needs of families who are rendered ineligible by an arbitrary shift in eligibility typically do not change.
Even if states change their levels of eligibility, it will not make
a difference unless they have the financial means to meet these
additional families' needs.
Over 40 percent of states have an average of 10,000 families on their waiting lists. The number of families on CCDF
waiting lists has continued to increase as federal funding for
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this legislation has plateaued. A greater number of families
on waiting lists is indicative of the surprisingly low percentage (10-14% of 15 million eligible families) of CCDF-eligible
families actually receiving child care subsidies (Greenberg &
Laracy, 2000; Matthews & Ewen, 2006). Some states have responded to decreased federal funding and long waiting lists by
including public-private partnerships that manage families'
lack of access to child care. For example, in New York, the NonProfit Assistance Corporation developed a project to provide
high-quality emergency back-up child care to low-wage
earners (Gennetian, Crosby, Huston & Lowe, 2004). However,
waiting lists still exist in many states, and are indicators of barriers to both care and ultimately employment for low-income,
single mothers. Mothers who live in states with waiting lists
experience more challenges obtaining care than mothers in
states without waiting lists.
Mothers in this study who lived in states allowing a higher
percentage of family incomes to be used towards child care
tended to be employed fewer hours per week than their counterparts in states where a lower percentage of mothers' salaries were being used for child care. Thus, as co-payment levels
increase, it may make greater economic sense for mothers to
work slightly fewer hours, and care for the children on their
own, rather than pay for care, since the less mothers earn, the
greater the actual amount of the subsidy. The cost of care simply
may be too great in comparison to one's earnings to remain
employed, thus working fewer hours will actually allow the
mother to receive a greater subsidy amount.
Finally, tiered levels of eligibility allow continuing receipt
of subsidies even when mothers begin to earn more money.
Recent qualitative research has shown mothers often experience a cascade of negative events from receiving a raise. An
increase in income pushes mothers over the low threshold of
eligibility for subsidies and unfortunately their wage increase
is usually not enough to fill the gap in child care costs left by
the loss in subsidy. Thus mothers are left to choose between an
increase in pay risking the loss of subsidized child care, and
turning down the promotional raise in wage. Mothers often
opt for the latter, which keeps them dependent on the government rather than increasing personal responsibility. Evidence
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presented in this paper indicates mothers' ability to be employed for more hours per week is increased when states implement a two-tiered system of eligibility.
Limitations
Some limitations to the present study should be noted.
First, this sample only included mothers who worked more
than 15 hours per week; the policy effects may be different among mothers who are on the margins of work, or who
appear to have a less intense commitment to the labor market.
Second, as when utilizing linear regression there is the threat
of omitted variable bias or not having controlled for all the
possible factors contributing to the variation in mothers' hours
of employment. To this point, individual state welfare policies
were not controlled for in the regression models, thus the differences in mothers' employment cannot be causally linked to
CCDF policy variations, as they may be simply reflective of the
state's overall "generosity" in terms of social welfare programs.
Despite these limitations, the focus of this study on state variations in CCDF implementation provides valuable first steps
towards increased insight into how this policy affects the lives
of low-income mothers and children and impacts mothers'
ability to be actively employed.
Policy Recommendations
Expansion of funding
When CCDF became law as a block grant, significant financial responsibility was removed from the federal government and placed on state governments and ultimately families. Child care funding was no longer an entitlement grant, or
a source of funding able to serve all families; as a block grant,
the federal government provided states with a set amount of
funding, and with this dollar amount states were supposed to
serve as many families as possible. One could argue many of
the decisions states have made subsequently regarding various
aspects of CCDF have been driven by budget constraints.
For example, since 2002, federal funding has remained relatively stagnant, with the real value of child care dollars states
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receive actually decreasing (Children's Welfare League of
America, 2006; Matthews & Ewen, 2006). In turn, only a small
percentage of the 15 million eligible families are being supported by CCDF (Matthews & Ewen, 2006). As child care funding
has decreased over the last four years, TANF work requirements have increased, precipitating a greater child care need
for low-income families while state governments are unable
to respond appropriately. In 2005, the total amount spent by
states on child care fell for the second year in a row; 22 states
made actual cuts in child care spending and nine of these state
cuts were at the level of 10 percent or more (Matthews & Ewen,
2006). The number of children covered by CCDF continues to
decline, and it is predicted that by 2011, 25 percent less children will be served than in 2000 (Matthews & Ewen, 2006).
An increase in funding for states could potentially impact
both families and child care providers. Over 90 percent of
families who receive assistance from CCDF need this support
in order to remain employed or to continue with school (U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, 2002). Mothers tend
to remain steadily employed and have greater potential to
move off welfare if their children are in high quality, stable care
(Matthews & Ewen, 2006). If low-income mothers remain employed and gain skills as well as education, they can continue
to move towards financial independence.
On-going researchand evaluation initiatives
It is necessary to continue conducting research among all
the states regarding CCDF in order to improve this program
at both state and federal levels. Congress sets aside approximately $10 million for CCDF child care research, demonstration, and evaluation (U.S. Office of Public Affairs, 2006). Much
of this research focuses upon describing elements of CCDF
such as the number of families served, the amount spent on
families, local child care markets in various states, cost-benefits of different child care strategies, and quality ratings of
child care facilities (Administration for Children and Families,
2006). Even though these studies have contributed significantly to what is known about CCDF, most do not focus on any of
the qualitative aspects of families' experiences. Evaluations of
policies like CCDF should qualitatively consider families' lived
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experiences by focusing on the elements of how the CCDF
has enhanced their family's lives. Such attention may point
states in the appropriate directions for improving child care
experiences for American families.
Conclusion
CCDF represents a philosophical commitment to support
low-income, welfare dependent families moving off government assistance and gaining financial independence;
however, the diverse state implementation of this legislation is
associated with varied levels of maternal employment, and
in turn, potential for financial independence of these families.
This study provides unique insight into how states' diverse
methods of legislative implementation, particularly in relation to access, equity, and stability, impact levels of maternal
employment.
With less than 15 percent of eligible families being supported by CCDF, mostly due to funding issues, there is undoubtedly a need to address the financial issues embedded in this
legislation. When low-income families do not have an opportunity to select high quality care for their children, the entire
family suffers. Parents spend their employed days worrying
about who is caring for their children, while their children are
in low quality child care environments, which ultimately may
impact their overall development. Alternatively, parents sometimes terminate their employment to care for their children,
since their work earnings barely cover the cost of child care.
This undesirable scenario often leaves families in a dire financial position.
A staggering number of low-income children remain underserved or without high quality child care while parents
continue to struggle with the decision to keep their job versus
put their child in an undesirable child care arrangement. As
long as children are in less than high quality child care, and
low-income parents are forced to choose between self-sufficiency and the fate of their child's development, more work
must occur in relation to child care legislation for low-income
families.
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